UDC 316.3-058.3(510)
DOI 10.20339/AM.03-26.109
Li Zhoru, PhD student at the Department of Sociology, Lomonosov Moscow State University (Russia) and Deputy Secretary General of the World Association for Political Economy (WAPE) and Visiting Scholar at the Institute for State Security Studies, Nankai University (China), e-mail: liz@my.msu.ru
Part I, based on historical materialism and institutional sociology, formulates a meso-level theory of the formation of political elites within the PRC’s party-state complex in the context of China’s modernization. In this context, in a debate with classical elitism and Western theories of modernization — both classical and critical — the analytical focus returns to organized political elites as historically situated collective actors. The formation of elites is interpreted as an institutionalized cycle of selection, socialization and placement of personnel in key nodes of power, which reproduces the administrative architecture and simultaneously constitutes the specific subjectivity of elites.
The proposed framework identifies four interrelated mechanisms: institutionalized elite rotation, institutional adaptation and innovation, social capital and elite networks, and socialist scientific-rational governance. Subjectivity is expressed through intellectual, normative, strategic, and innovative factors. Official statistical and sociological data are used not to identify causes, but to demonstrate analytical productivity, and are employed in comparative studies of elite-oriented development trajectories.
Keywords: Chinese modernization, the formation of political elites, institutionalized elite rotation, social capital and elite networks, socialist scientific-rational governance
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